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Pathways to Marital and Non-Marital First Birth: the Role 
of His and Her Education 
 
 
Abstract A key demographic trend of the past decades has been the increasing share of first births 
occurring outside marriage. In analysing factors associated with this, scholars have tended to focus 
on the characteristics of only one of the parents, typically the mother. This study examines the 
pathways to parenthood from a couple’s perspective, focusing on the role of educational pairings, i.e. 
the combination of his and her education. By means of a multistate approach, we examine the 
connection between educational pairings and the occurrence of the first birth inside or outside 
marriage for 12 European countries. The presence of at least one highly educated partner lowers the 
rate of non-marital first births. Strikingly, it does not matter whether it is he or she who has the highest 
level of education. 
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Introduction 
For many people, marriage is no longer a prerequisite for childbearing, especially since the 1970s, 
and, consequently, rates of childbearing within cohabitation have increased over time (Sobotka and 
Toulemon 2008; Perelli-Harris et al. 2012). Although changes in family behaviour have not occurred 
everywhere to the same extent and speed, there are at least two common features across European 
countries. First, non-marital childbearing has not spread homogenously: differences between 
educational subgroups have been detected (Perelli-Harris 2010). This is associated with the fact that 
new family forms play a key role in the reproduction of social inequalities and in affecting children’s 
well-being in different social strata (McLanahan and Percheski 2008). Second, within Europe, the 
increase in non-marital childbearing has been largely attributed to the rise of childbearing within 
cohabiting unions rather than to single-motherhood (Kiernan 2004; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010).  
In studies about new family forms, scholars have focused mainly on the relation between the 
mother’s human capital and non-marital childbearing and rarely on the link between human capital 
and non-marital fatherhood (Carlson et al. 2011; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). Acknowledging that most 
non-marital births occur within co-residential unions, the decision to have a child usually involves 
two persons, i.e. the couple. However, scholars have disregarded the role of partners’ educational 
characteristics as determinant of non-marital childbearing, keeping an individual–female perspective. 
Only in recent years, the partner’s role is increasingly considered in studies as a potential determinant 
of the transition to parenthood (see e.g. Begall 2013; Jalovaara and Miettinen 2013; Gustafsson and 
Worku 2006; Nitsche et al. 2015; Vignoli et al. 2012), but empirical evidence on how it is related to 
non-marital family formation is still scarce (Trimarchi et al. forthcoming). 
The couple’s perspective is important because the focus on the features of only one partner may 
lead to a misinterpretation of the results (Gustafsson and Worku 2006). Focusing on education, the 
main consequence is that the effects of the educational level of one partner may to some extent 
actually reflect the effects of the education of the other partner. As a result, if gender differences exist 
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in the association between education and non-marital fertility, individual-level results would be 
inconclusive: negative and positive effects will cancel out, leading to a flat gradient. On the other 
hand, if the association between education and non-marital fertility is the same for both sexes, 
individual-level studies tend to overestimate or to underestimate the educational gradient. In both 
cases, depending on the prevalent educational mating pattern, i.e. on the way partners tend to sort 
homogamously or heterogamously according to their level of education, the bias could be more or 
less serious. In this regard, another reason to focus on the association between education of both 
partners and non-marital childbearing is linked to the changing composition of mating markets. 
Individuals with difficulties to find a suitable partner may be inclined to settle for a less committed 
partnership without, however, renouncing to childbearing (Harknett 2008; Van Bavel 2012). This 
may be the case for the highly educated women who settle with a lower educated partner, especially 
since the reversal of the gender gap in higher education (Van Bavel 2012).  
Furthermore, considering both partners has also implications on the societal level, because the 
way  partners combine their human-capital, i.e. the educational pairing of his and her education, 
affects the reproduction of inequalities in societies. Educational assortative mating patterns reflect 
the degree of openness in a society and  affect the distribution of resources in societies (Blossfeld 
2009; Schwartz 2009). If men and women mate assortatively according to their socio-economic status 
and if both lower educated men and lower educated women tend towards higher rates of cohabitation 
and unmarried parenthood, we would expect a concentration of these family behaviours among 
couples with lower socio-economic resources. This would lead to an exacerbation of social 
inequalities in societies driven by changes in family forms. 
In this paper we aim to fill the gap in the literature on the educational gradient of non-marital 
childbearing by examining the link between educational pairing and the transition to first child, while 
distinguishing between couples who got married before the birth of the child and those who did not. 
How is the combined education of the partners associated with pathways to first birth? A couple may 
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make the transition to the first child without going through the transition to marriage. Alternatively, 
a couple may first marry and then have the first child.  To investigate which of these pathways a 
couple has followed and how both his and her education are associated with the trajectory, we apply 
multistate modelling. This kind of model is suitable to understand how differences in life histories 
are associated with specific background characteristics, e.g. the educational pairing of the couple, 
since they are estimated using data that track occurrences of events and those units at risk for each 
event of interest (Willekens 2014). We used the retrospective fertility and partnership histories for 12 
European countries recorded in the Generation and Gender Surveys (GGS) and in the Italian Family 
and Social Subjects (FSS) survey of 2009. 
Inequalities, new family forms and the role of educational assortative mating 
On a societal level, the diffusion of more liberal family behaviours such as divorce, cohabitation and 
non-marital childbearing has often been interpreted as an expression of an ideational change in values 
and attitudes toward the family within the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) framework (Van 
de Kaa 1987; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). According to the SDT, both cohabitation and non-marital 
childbearing are considered, at least in an initial stage, prerogative behaviours of the more secularized 
individuals, typically the highly educated, as far as those behaviours are believed to be antithetic to 
traditional family forms and life paths (Lesthaghe 2010; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). 
On the individual level, despite the steep increase in the level of non-marital fertility, marriage 
remains generally more conducive to childbearing than unmarried cohabitation (Baizan et al. 2003). 
Partners perceive higher commitment through marriage (Perelli et al. 2014) and in particular for men, 
marriage is perceived as expressing a higher degree of commitment than unmarried cohabitation 
(Lehrer et al. 1996). Since married unions tend to be more stable than unmarried ones, they tend to 
have higher fertility as well (Lillard and Waite 1993; Lillard et al. 1995; Baizan et al. 2003). 
6 
 
In particular, scholars have been interested in analysing the educational gradient in non-marital 
childbearing and how it varies over time and across contexts. To understand how non-marital family 
formation is associated with educational differences, scholars have privileged an individual-level of 
analysis. Only recently, the focus has been shifted towards couples’ behaviour and on the interaction 
between partners’ socio-economic characteristics, including his and her education (Van Bavel 2012; 
Trimarchi et al. forthcoming). 
Non-marital family formation and the role of educational level 
A strand of literature emphasizes the lack of socio-economic resources as determinant in the choice 
of cohabitation over marriage to form a new family (Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011; Perelli-Harris et 
al. 2010). More specifically, for many people, marriage is associated with an expensive wedding 
ceremony and marriage as a whole requires that the couple is able to secure their long-term economic 
independence (Kravdal 1999; Salvini and Vignoli 2014). As a consequence, non-marital childbearing 
is expected to be more prevalent among the least educated. Perelli-Harris and Gerber (2011) called 
this gradient the “pattern-of-disadvantage”. Insofar as marriage is becoming “a province of the most 
educated” (Goldstein and Kenney 2001:506), the diffusion of cohabitation and non-marital 
childbearing among the lower educated would exacerbate inequalities in society. Children born to 
highly educated women would enjoy a growing amount of resources, both in social and economic 
terms. Children born to low educated women would face the dissolution of their parents’ union more 
frequently and suffer higher poverty rates (McLanahan 2004; McLanahan and Percheski 2008). 
The “pattern of disadvantage” framework found support from several empirical studies across 
different contexts. Perelli-Harris et al. (2010) found that in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Russia, United Kingdom and Western Germany, the negative educational gradient in the transition to 
first birth for women was steeper for non-marital births compared to marital births. In Italy, the 
educational gradient of the first non-marital birth compared to the first marital birth was U-shaped. 
The authors related these findings to the low prevalence of cohabitation and argued that in contexts 
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where non-marital childbearing is just emerging, as in Italy, it is more prevalent among both low and 
highly educated women than among the group in between. In contrast, the low educated are more 
likely to have a non-marital child than all the other groups if cohabitation is common. In France, the 
link between education and non-marital childbearing has changed over time: highly educated women 
were driving the increase in non-marital childbearing during the 1970s and 1980s; from around the 
start of the 21st century, the positive educational gradient has disappeared (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). 
In Hungary (Spelder and Kamaras 2008) and the Czech Republic (Sobotka et al. 2008), the diffusion 
of non-marital childbearing followed a bottom-up rather than a top-down pattern. 
While the pattern of disadvantage framework mainly focuses on women’s socio-economic 
conditions, Oppenheimer (2003) proposed a theoretical argument based on the relation between 
men’s socio-economic conditions and the rise of cohabitation. Men with poor and uncertain economic 
prospects favour cohabitation as union type because a low and unstable economic situation may 
undermine  their capabilities to make a strong commitment (Oppenheimer 2003). Moreover, men’s 
uncertainty on the labour market  affects also the lifestyle that they will develop. Thus men who have 
uncertain careers may have difficulties in finding a suitable partner, which would lead to delay 
marriage. All in all, studies in European contexts have found that men with a lower socio-economic 
position are less likely to get married (Kalmijn 2011). From the study by Carlson et al. (2011), it is 
clear that the pattern of disadvantage is also applicable to US men. The authors found that non-marital 
fatherhood is negatively associated with education: the higher the level of education, the lower the 
risk of having a child outside marriage. 
Given these earlier findings and based on the economic argument that more education brings 
more resources to get married, we formulate Hypothesis 1: there is a positive educational gradient in 
family formation through marriage. More specifically, Hypothesis 1a contends that there is a positive 
educational gradient with regard to the transition from cohabitation to marriage. Hypothesis 1b 
concerns the transition from cohabitation to parenthood: couples with more education are expected 
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to have lower birth rates while they are still unmarried than couples with less education. The presence 
of at least one highly educated partner is expected to be associated with a reduced risk of non-marital 
childbearing. 
Non-marital family formation and the role of educational assortative mating 
The theoretical arguments mentioned so far only look at the human capital of either women or men. 
More generally, studies on fertility have particularly privileged a female perspective rather than a 
couple’s perspective, even if we know that most children are born to couples. An argument that has 
been used to justify the focus on just one of the partners is that people often mate with individuals 
who share similar characteristics (Corijn et al. 1996). 
The tendency to form homogamous partnerships has indeed been documented for several 
characteristics, e.g. age, ethnicity, religion, education, etc. (Kalmijn 1991, 1994). Our focus here is 
on assortative mating by education, because education may affect individual economic potential and 
also individual tastes, preferences and lifestyles (Blossfeld 2009). In general, educational homogamy 
remains the most common mating pattern in Europe (Blossfeld and Timm 2003; Hamplova 2009; De 
Hauw et al. 2017), but remarkable changes have occurred with regard to heterogamous couples. 
Recent studies have shown that unions in which the man is more educated than the woman 
(hypergamy) are now less common than unions in which the woman is higher educated than the man 
(hypogamy) (Esteve et al. 2012; Grow and Van Bavel 2015; De Hauw et al. 2017). 
With the reversal of the gender inequality in education, there are more highly educated women 
reaching reproductive ages than highly educated men. As a result, many highly educated women will 
not be able to mate homogamously, given the lack of sufficient highly educated men. This implies 
that women who are willing to become mothers, may be inclined to mate with a lower educated 
partner in a less committed type of union  like unmarried cohabitation (Van Bavel 2012). Research 
from the United States has indeed argued that the type of union is associated with the type of 
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educational match: “a different kind of relationship calls for a different kind of partner” (Schoen and 
Weinick 1993: 413). 
Approaches that emphasize cultural aspects of educational assortative mating consider the match 
in lifestyles, values, and preferences (Blackwell and Lichter 2000). In the mate selection process, 
cohabitation is seen as the stage where partners evaluate each other according to their “cultural 
matching”. As a consequence, unmarried cohabitations, where commitment may be weaker, could 
include relatively more heterogamous unions compared to marriages; matches that share more 
cultural traits will be more likely to make the transition to marriage (Blackwell and Lichter 2000; 
Saarela and Finnäs 2014). 
Thus, homogamous partners are expected to have more similar beliefs and lifestyles, which 
would lead to strengthen their commitment through marriage (i.e. “cultural matching”). Based on this 
argument, we formulate Hypothesis 2: homogamous partners are expected to have a higher transition 
rate from cohabitation to marriage compared to the heterogamous couples. 
The micro-economic approach to the household, instead, emphasizes the role of specialization 
within the couple. According to Becker’s theory of partner’s specialization, a dissimilarity of socio-
economic resources between spouses induces higher gains from marriage because partners increase 
their interdependence by the division of labour, which may be attached to gender roles (Becker 1991). 
As a result, since educationally homogamous couples may be less likely to specialize, these couples 
may be more inclined to live within a more “equal” kind of union such as cohabitation, whereas more 
specialized couples would have greater gains from a long-term committed union such as marriage 
(Brines and Joyner 1999; Schoen and Weinick 1993). Following the specialization argument, the 
group of heterogamous couples cannot be considered homogeneous in the propensity for non-marital 
family formation. 
We formulate three levels of comparison to highlight differences between educational pairings 
with regard to the propensity for non-marital family formation. First, for the reasons explained above, 
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educationally homogamous couples may have a higher propensity for non-marital family formation 
than heterogamous couples. Second, given that the gains from marriage according to Becker’s 
framework depend on the traditional gender division of labour, couples where the man is more 
educated than the woman may be more inclined to marry because the difference in economic potential 
between the partners would strengthen the gains from marriage for both partners. Couples where the 
woman is more educated than the man would be less inclined to marry. 
Third, while both homogamous and hypogamous couples are expected to have a higher 
propensity for non-marital family formation than hypergamous couples, we may expect that (of the 
former two) hypogamous couples have the highest propensity for non-marital family formation 
because the expected gains from marriage would be lowest. This is based on the assumption that there 
is a tendency for a traditional gender division of labour. The gains would be lower for women because 
their male partners have a lower earning potential, and the gains would be lower for men because 
their highly educated female partners may be less inclined to provide unpaid domestic work. As a 
result, the propensity for non-marital family formation of the educationally homogamous couples 
would be in between hypergamous couples, with the lowest propensity for non-marital family 
formation, and the hypogamous couples with the highest propensity. 
Previous findings that account for the characteristics of both partners and how these affect the 
transition to a marital or non-marital birth are scarce. Trimarchi et al. (forthcoming) found that the 
presence of at least one highly educated partner decreases the risk of non-marital childbearing relative 
to marital childbearing in Austria (cohorts 1970-1983) and Eastern Germany (cohorts 1971-1973 and 
1981-1983). In Western Germany, instead, the authors found that hypergamous couples are less likely 
to have a non-marital birth relative to marital compared to other groups of educational pairings. 
Overall, the results showed the importance of considering the combination of the educational level of 
both partners when studying non-marital childbearing and the role of different contexts. The authors, 
however, only focused on the transition to the first child, disregarding the intermediate step, i.e. the 
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transition to marriage (or not). Looking into a wider range of countries, in this paper we also account 
for the association between educational assortative mating and the transition to marriage, including 
couples who have not had a first child (yet). 
Saarela and Finnäs (2014) focused on several family transitions and found that, in Finland, 
heterogamous couples have a higher risk of union dissolution, a higher risk of living in an unmarried 
union and a lower risk of becoming parents compared to the homogamous couples. Moreover, they 
found family formation within marriage to be more typical of the highly educated, whereas unmarried 
family formation is more common among the lower educated (Saarela and Finnäs 2014). These results 
strongly suggest that an interaction between homogamy and the level of education affects family 
formation behaviour of couples, highlighting the importance of a couple’s perspective approach to 
fertility. 
Based on these earlier findings as well as theoretical arguments, we formulate Hypothesis 3 that 
focuses on the behavioural differences within the group of heterogamous couples in non-marital 
family formation. We expect that hypergamous couples are more inclined towards traditional family 
behaviours, while hypogamous couples are more prone to less conventional family behaviours, 
especially in countries with traditional gender roles expectations (i.c. Italy and Poland). This 
expectation stems from the Beckerian assumption that an education imbalance in favour of the male 
partner leads to a gendered division of labour which generates higher gains from marriage for both 
partners. This hypothesis may be reinforced by socio-economic arguments according to which, given 
the same level of education, men may have a higher earning potential than women. In particular, 
Hypothesis 3a concerns the transition from cohabitation to marriage: we expect that hypergamous 
couples have a higher rate of marriage compared to hypogamous couples. As a complement, 
Hypothesis 3b contends that hypergamous couples are more inclined to have a first child within 
marriage compared to hypogamous couples. 
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Data 
We used the first wave of Generation and Gender Survey (GGS) data for 11 European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Norway, 
Romania) and the Family and Social Subjects (FSS) 2009 for Italy. Since the FSS is the Italian version 
of GGS, we preferred to use the most recent survey instead of the Italian GGS conducted in 2003. To 
acquire information on both partners’ characteristics, we selected only individuals who are in a union 
at the time of interview. For the GGS countries the information is derived from both male and female 
respondents. For Italy we could use only female respondents, since in the Italian GGS male 
respondents are either the partners of the female respondents, or single men with no information about 
previous partners’ educational level. We focused on cohorts for which the respondents and their 
partners are born after 1950 because changes in family behaviours motivating our study occurred 
from the 1970s onwards, which implies that the cohorts affected were born in the 1950s or later. 
Considering the respondents born after 1950 has also methodological advantages, since according to 
Vergauwen et al. (2015), GGS data are suitable to study fertility especially for cohorts born after the 
mid-1940s and for periods after the mid-1970s. The focus is the transition to parenthood, thus we 
selected couples in which the woman was 15-45 years old at the beginning of the co-residential union 
and we excluded cases in which one of the partners had a child before in another relationship (overall 
we have 48,344 couples). Appendix A.1 details the number of cases that were and were not selected 
in our analytical sample for various reasons. 
The main explanatory variable: educational pairings 
Given the importance of the concept of assortative mating, social scientists have invested 
considerable effort in its measurement. On the macro level, scholars have been interested in 
measuring the propensity to marry partners of given characteristics using measures of attraction which 
also account for the pool of potential mates (Schoen 1981). For studies whose focus is on the micro 
level, on education in particular, the main concern has been how to include the best indicator which 
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could account both for the effect of education and the effect of educational differences between 
partners (Eeckhout et al. 2012). 
Since the focus of this paper is on a micro-level, in line with previous studies on the effect of 
educational assortative mating on demographic behaviour (see e.g. Mäenpää and Jalovaara 2014), we 
have defined our main explanatory variable as the combined educational attainment of the partners. 
Collapsing categories from the international standard classification of education (ISCED 1997), we 
grouped individuals into three levels of attainment: low, medium and high. The first group includes those 
who completed primary plus lower secondary school (at least 8 years of schooling, ISCED 0, 1, 2). The 
medium category consists of individuals who attained the upper-secondary and those who also got a post-
secondary level (ISCED 3, 4). Finally, respondents and their partners were defined highly educated if they 
got a bachelor/master/PhD degree (ISCED 5, 6). 
In our model we used a compound measure of educational assortative mating which consists of 
three categories for couples where men and women have the same educational attainment, i.e. 
homogamous couples (“both low” (1); “both medium” (2), “both high” (3)); two categories for 
hypergamy (couples in which man is highly educated and the woman medium or low educated (4) 
and couples in which men are medium educated and women low educated (5)); two categories for 
hypogamy (couples in which the woman is highly educated and the man medium or low educated (6) 
and couples in which women are medium educated and men low educated (7)). A separate category 
is assigned in case of missing educational information for one of the partners. 
It should be noted that the educational pairing variable is not time-varying because we did not 
have information about both partners educational trajectories, we only knew the graduation date of 
the respondent. Thus, our results may suffer of anticipatory bias, since partners may have acquired 
their highest educational level after the event of interest occurred. This is a concern especially with 
regard to the transition to parenthood: if individuals become parents before attaining the educational 
degree that they desire, parenthood may reduce the likelihood to achieve that specific level of 
14 
 
education (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008). In Table 1 we report the proportion of respondents that 
acquired the level of education declared at interview after co-residence and after each of our event of 
interest, i.e. marriage and first birth. In the majority of countries, between 11-29% of the respondents 
attained their current level of education after starting living together with the partner. Italy and 
Norway represent exceptions. In Italy, this occurs only in the 3% of the cases, whereas in Norway 
almost 40% of the respondents in the sample has not reached the current level of education once 
starting to co-reside. The proportion of respondents that obtained their level of education after 
marriage is higher than 20% in Norway and two Baltic countries, between 10-20% in Central-Eastern 
European countries, and lower than 10% in Austria, Belgium, France and Italy. These proportions get 
lower when we look at the birth of the first child. In the majority of countries, among those who 
became parents, less than 10% attained the level of education after the birth of the child. Only in 
Norway, given the higher flexibility of the educational system, the proportion of respondents that 
becomes a parent before attaining the current level of education exceeds 20%.  
 
Table 1 Proportion of respondents who attained the current educational level before marriage or 
before the birth of the child  
 
Respondents 
attaining 
education after 
co-residence (%) 
N 
respondents 
Respondents 
attaining 
education after 
marriage (%) 
N respondents 
who got 
married 
Respondents 
attaining 
education after 
1st birth (%) 
N respondents 
who got the 
1st child 
Austria 23.4 2366 9.6 1706 7.4 1747 
Belgium 11.1 2642 8.1 2117 5.3 2158 
Bulgaria 21.0 5031 19.4 4473 13.7 4590 
Czech Republic 11.7 2577 11.8 2184 6.9 1989 
Estonia 29.1 2364 24.7 1742 16.1 1995 
France 17.3 3097 8.4 2350 5.6 2525 
Hungary 17.3 3994 15.7 3407 9.7 3099 
Italy 2.9 6213 2.6 5866 1.8 5382 
Lithuania 28.0 3256 25.9 2892 16.8 2727 
Norway 39.9 4819 29.5 3484 22.3 3981 
Poland 20.3 7402 18.2 6980 13.1 6534 
Romania 11.9 4583 11.0 4399 6.8 4001 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on Generations and Gender Surveys and the Italian Family and Social Subjects (2009) 
samples. 
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Table 2 shows the distribution of the educational assortative mating variable - as it has been 
employed in the models. Homogamous couples represent more than half of the couples in all countries. 
The majority of couples consisted of both medium educated partners, with the exception of Belgium 
and Italy. In Belgium, most couples are homogamously highly educated (32%), whereas in Italy the 
majority are homogamously low educated couples (30%). Even if the most typical mating pattern is 
homogamy, it is interesting to look at the distribution of heterogamous couples. As we can see in 
Table 2, in the majority of countries, couples in which the woman is more educated than the man are 
more common than couples where the man is more educated than his partner. This is in line with 
recent trends of educational assortative mating which have been found across European and non-
European countries (Esteve et al. 2012; Grow and Van Bavel 2015). 
Control variables  
We included the age difference between partners in our models because it is  an important determinant 
of couple’s fertility (Bhrolchain 1992; Bozon 1991). It is operationalized in five categories: age 
difference is 0 or 1 (considered as age homogamy); the woman is older than the man; the man is 2 to 
4 years older than the woman; the man is 5 years or more older than the woman; and a missing 
category if the age difference between partners is not available. We also control for the respondent’s 
sex; the woman’s age at union formation and its square to control for non-linearities; the union’s 
cohort in four categories: 1967-1979 (1); 1980-1989 (2); 1990-1999 (3); 2000-2010 (4). We added a 
control only for the union order of the respondent, since the union order of the partner is unavailable. 
Finally, we added a variable which specifies whether a conception occurred before marriage.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics by country 
 
Austria 
2008-09 
Belgium 
2008-10 
Bulgaria 
2004-05 
CzechRep 
2005 
Estonia 
2004-05 
France 
2005 
Hungary 
2004-05 
Italy 
2009 
Lithuania 
2006 
Norway 
2007-08 
Poland 
2010-11 
Romania 
2005 
Sex (%)             
Male 38.0 48.0 41.4 48.0 38.7 44.0 44.7  55.6 49.5 45.4 52.8 
Female 62.0 52.0 58.6 52.0 61.3 56.0 55.3 100.0 44.4 50.5 54.6 47.2 
Union's cohort (%)             
1967-1979 0.1 16.1 13.5 16.0 17.8 16.5 22.1 13.2 13.8 13.8 18.7 19.3 
1980-1989 18.5 26.4 36.4 29.0 31.5 27.6 29.3 28.7 31.6 26.9 24.6 33.5 
1990-1999 41.3 28.4 37.1 30.5 33.1 35.8 30.7 30.1 29.9 33.8 24.9 34.7 
2000-2010 40.2 29.1 13.1 24.6 17.6 20.2 17.9 28.0 24.7 25.5 31.8 12.4 
Educational pairings (%)             
Low homogamous 3.5 11.1 13.6 2.9 2.7 8.2 6.0 30.2 2.8 2.6 3.1 13.3 
Med homogamous 52.6 17.1 44.4 62.2 42.3 28.5 53.4 25.1 49.4 22.0 54.5 50.9 
High homogamous 11.0 32.3 14.1 7.9 14.9 23.3 11.1 6.8 16.2 26.0 14.9 8.7 
He high She lower  13.5 8.3 3.6 9.7 7.8 7.6 5.7 4.5 8.6 8.3 4.8 4.4 
He medium She low 8.3 7.2 5.5 4.8 4.2 9.9 9.5 10.6 2.8 7.5 4.7 16.1 
He lower She high 7.8 14.5 13.0 5.2 21.0 13.9 10.1 8.5 14.0 16.8 12.6 3.0 
He low She medium 3.3 8.0 5.6 5.1 7.1 8.2 4.1 14.3 6.1 5.5 4.7 3.7 
Not available  1.7 0.2 2.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 11.4 0.7 0.0 
Respondent union's order (%)             
First union 84.4 70.2 98.8 94.7 92.9 88.5 88.6 93.6 97.9 82.7 98.2 98.5 
Higher order 15.6 29.8 1.3 5.3 7.1 11.5 11.4 2.1 2.2 17.4 1.8 1.5 
Not available        4.4     
Age difference (%)             
Age homogamy (or <= 1 year) 22.2 28.1 20.1 23.3 27.2 26.5 20.3 25.2 25.6 25.4 25.8 19.8 
Woman older 2+ 12.4 12.2 6.8 7.2 12.7 13.7 10.1 7.2 10.6 11.8 10.6 8.2 
Man older 2-4 37.7 36.9 38.8 42.2 34.8 37.0 39.4 36.6 44.0 38.5 39.6 36.7 
Man older 5+ 27.7 22.4 33.8 27.1 25.3 22.8 30.0 31.0 19.8 24.2 24.0 35.2 
Not available 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0              
Median Woman Age at union (years) 22 23 20 22 21 22 21 24 22 23 22 21 
Median time in union till interview (years) 11.08 16.33 14.91 13.83 14.91 14.33 15.33 17.25 15.54 14.91 18.08 16.05 
N events by transition             
Cohabitation to Marriage 974 740 2615 671 787 1238 564 536 580 1570 1141 654 
Cohabitation to Kid 608 399 553 175 561 764 251 323 145 1633 390 270 
Marriage to Kid 1139 1759 4037 1814 1434 1761 2848 5069 2582 2348 6144 3731 
N respondents 2,366 2,642 5,031 2,577 2,364 3,097 3,994 6,213 3,256 4,819 7,402 4,583 
Source: authors’ calculations on Generations and Gender Surveys, survey-years are specified for each country, and the Italian Family and Social Subjects (2009) samples. 
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Table 3 shows the distribution of couples by country, according to their marital status at the time 
of co-residential union. The difference in the institutionalization of cohabitation and its diffusion 
across Europe shows up in a very simple way in Table 3. In countries where cohabitation has typically 
spread much slower and/or does not have a legal status yet, the majority of couples start co-residing 
directly by marrying. This holds for the Central-Eastern European countries (i.e. Poland, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Romania and, to a lesser extent, Czech Republic) and Italy. In Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, France and Norway, instead, the majority of partners start to co-reside as an unmarried 
couple and eventually marry. 
 
Table 3 Distribution of couples by country and marital status at the time of union formation 
Country  Cohabitation first Direct marriage Total 
 (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) 
Austria  1988 84.0 378 16.0 2366 100 
Belgium  1383 52.4 1259 47.7 2642 100 
Bulgaria  3363 66.9 1668 33.2 5031 100 
Czech Republic 1139 44.2 1438 55.8 2577 100 
Estonia  1610 68.1 754 31.9 2364 100 
France 2354 76.0 743 24.0 3097 100 
Hungary  1224 30.7 2770 69.4 3994 100 
Italy 1034 16.6 5179 83.4 6213 100 
Lithuania  996 30.6 2260 69.4 3256 100 
Norway 3808 79.0 1011 21.0 4819 100 
Poland  1796 24.3 5606 75.7 7402 100 
Romania  1008 22.0 3575 78.0 4583 100 
Total 21703 44.9 26641 55.1 48344 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations on Generations and Gender Surveys and the Italian Family and Social Subjects (2009) 
samples. 
 
Method 
We applied multistate models to test our hypotheses about the effect of educational pairings on the 
chosen pathway of first birth. The multistate approach can account for possible changes in union 
status of the couples since they started to cohabit till the interview date. As we need information about 
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both his and her education, we focus on people who are in a union at the time of the interview since 
we only know the education of the current partner, not of earlier partners for most countries. On one 
hand, this has advantages with regard to the quality of reported fertility and partnership information 
(cf. Vergauwen et al. 2015), since people tend to report and better recall events related to the present. 
On the other hand, it is a limitation because couples who split up before the interview are left censored. 
This implies that we may underestimate non-marital childbearing, since cohabiting couples are more 
likely to split up (Kiernan 2004), and that hypogamous couples may be underrepresented in our study 
if they are less stable (as indicated by Blossfeld 2014; Jalovaara 2013; and Mäenpää and Jalovaara 
2014; but not by Schwartz and Han 2014; Theunis et al. 2015). 
We selected couples that were intact at the time of the interview and looked retrospectively at 
their changes in union status leading to the first shared birth, if it occurred. Unions that survived until 
the time of the interview may on average be more stable than the total population of couples ever 
formed. Obviously, unions formed during the years closer to the interview may be much more 
heterogeneous with regard to their stability (as they were not at risk yet to split up). To check how 
strongly this affected our results, we ran analyses only for recently formed unions (2000-2010) and 
found that our conclusions remained the same. 
In this setup, our main event of interest is the birth of the first child, which represents the 
absorbing state in multistate terminology (Putter et al. 2007; Willekens 2014). Figure 1 shows all the 
possible transitions within our analytical state-space. At the start of the co-residential union, partners 
may cohabit (top left in Figure 1) or be married (top right). After marriage, couples are at risk of only 
one transition, i.e. transition to parenthood. Couples who started co-residence as an unmarried couple 
were at risk of two possible pathways. First, they may have gotten married and gotten a child 
afterwards (Figure 1 – solid line). Second, they may have a child within cohabitation (Figure 1 – 
dashed line). In the last case a separate analysis will be carried out to check which kind of couples 
will eventually marry after a non-marital birth. This model assumes a Markov process, implying that 
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the pathway of a couple and its timing will depend only on the present state and not on the event 
history of the couple. 
 
Figure 1 State-space considered and possible transitions. 
 
Once we have all the transition dates, we expand the dataset for each possible transition that the 
couple may experience, defining the entry into and the exit from that state (or the end of the 
observational period) and a status variable which defines if the transition has occurred or not. As in 
Putter et al. (2007), to estimate the model, we apply a Cox’s proportional hazard model for each 
transition (i.e. stratified hazard model), separately country by country. Formally, the hazard for 
transition i to j for a couple with a covariate vector Z will be: 
𝜆𝑖𝑗(𝑡|𝒁) = 𝜆𝑖𝑗,0(𝑡)exp⁡(𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑇𝒁) 
Where 𝜆𝑖𝑗,0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard of transition i to j which is not parametrically specified, and 
𝛽𝑖𝑗 are the regression coefficients which describe the effect of the covariate-profile of each couple. 
We have fitted the model by using the mstate package implemented in the R software (De Wreede, 
Fiocco and Putter 2011). The regression coefficients are estimated via the maximum likelihood 
method and we apply a stepwise modelling procedure to fit the best model. In order to evaluate the 
goodness of fit of the models we used the likelihood-ratio test. The likelihood-ratio test showed in 
Table B3 of Appendix A.2 indicates the increase in model fit after including the educational pairing 
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variable. We selected 12 countries which mirror the main family regimes in Europe and, rather than 
just pooling all countries, we replicate the analyses country by country to check how sensitive our 
main results are to context. Given the low number of countries that could be included, we are not able 
to address the role played by contextual factors.  
Results 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the main results relative to the effect of educational pairing for all the 
transitions considered (Appendix A.2 gives all the model estimates). Each of these figures consists 
of a grid of panels, with columns representing her educational attainment and rows representing his 
educational attainment, the lines represent 95% confidence intervals of the point estimate. Each panel 
shows a specific combination of her and his educational level to be compared with the reference 
category. The reference category are the medium educated homogamous couples, represented by the 
horizontal line in each panel. On the diagonal of each figure we find panels comparing the 
homogamous couples to the reference category (the panel in the very middle of each figure does not 
give estimates as this is the medium educated reference category). Above the diagonal, we have 
panels representing the results for the hypogamous couples, whereas the hypergamous ones are 
situated below the diagonal.   
Figure 2 displays the hazard ratios for the transition from cohabitation to marriage. When 
focusing on the diagonal, we find that in countries where the difference is significant, low educated 
homogamous couples have a lower rate of transition from cohabitation to marriage compared to the 
reference category of medium educated homogamous couples. Austria is a striking exception: low 
educated homogamous couples are found to have almost 2.5 times higher transition rate to marriage 
compared to the medium homogamous couples. Additional inspection of the data revealed that this 
is related to the fact that migrant populations, who are typically more traditional with regard to the 
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type of union, are strongly represented among the low educated, which also supports previous 
findings about Austria by Berghammer et al. (2014). 
The heterogamous couples, represented above and below the diagonal, generally tend not to be 
statistically different from the medium homogamous couples. However, when switching the reference 
category to the low educated homogamous couples, we notice that the heterogamous couples with at 
least one highly educated partner tend to have higher rates of marriage than low educated 
homogamous couples (see Appendix A.3 – Table C1 for all the pairwise contrasts). This difference 
holds for Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania and Romania, and it is in line with our expectations 
derived from the socio-economic Hypothesis 1a, according to which there is a positive educational 
gradient with regard to the transition from cohabitation to marriage 
Moreover, there is no evidence for the second hypothesis, which is about the differences between 
homogamy and heterogamy. According to Hypothesis 2, we should find that homogamous partners 
have a higher transition rate from cohabitation to marriage compared to the heterogamous couples. 
After testing all the contrasts, for all levels of education, between homogamous couples and 
heterogamous couples (see Figure 2 and Appendix A.3 – Table C1), we found no significantly 
different transition rates from cohabitation to marriage. Basically, we find no empirical evidence for 
an effect of homogamy (or heterogamy) as such, when detached from the role of the absolute level 
of education of the partners. 
In general, the results for the transition from cohabitation to marriage support the socio-economic 
argument of the first hypothesis (1a), whereas we did not find evidence that lends support to 
hypothesis 3a according to which hypergamous couples have a higher rate of marriage compared to 
hypogamous couples. Still, we should highlight that beyond Austria, two more countries deviate from 
this general pattern. First, in Bulgaria, highly educated homogamous couples have a lower transition 
rate to marriage compared to the medium homogamous and the heterogamous couples. It remains 
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unclear why the presence of only one highly educated partner enhances the transition to marriage 
more than if the couple would be composed of two highly educated partners. 
Second, Poland also represents a puzzling exception. Here, couples in which the man is highly 
educated and the woman is lower educated, are estimated to have a lower transition rate to marriage 
compared to all the homogamous and the hypogamous educational pairings. Among the countries 
considered, Poland represents a traditional context, where the diffusion of cohabitation has been 
relatively slow and the male-breadwinner model persists as main family model especially after the 
birth of the first child (Kotowska et al. 2008; Matysiak 2005). This result, however, contrasts with 
our expectations according to which, especially in traditional contexts, hypergamous couples are 
more prone to marriage than hypogamous ones (hypothesis 3a). 
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Figure 2 Hazard ratios for the transition from cohabitation to marriage  
 
 
Source: Models’ estimates (see Appendix A.2, Table B1), GGS and Italian FSS 2009 
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Next, Figure 3 shows hazard ratios for the transition from cohabitation to first birth. In all 
countries, low educated homogamous couples have higher non-marital birth rates compared to 
medium educated couples, whereas highly educated unmarried couples exhibit lower rates (diagonal 
Figure 3). In general, there are no statistically significant differences between heterogamous couples 
and the reference category (medium educated homogamous couples). Changing our reference 
category to highly or low educated homogamous couples, the results strongly support the socio-
economic resource argument, i.e. hypothesis 1b, according to which the presence of at least one highly 
educated partner should reduce the risk of a non-marital birth (see Appendix A.3 – Table C2 for all 
the pairwise contrasts). As the overall human-capital of the couple increases, the risk of non-marital 
family formation decreases in basically all countries. This is striking because it implies that there is 
no difference in family formation behaviour depending on whether it is the woman or the man who 
is the partner with more education. In both cases, the estimates point in the same direction. 
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Figure 3 Hazard ratios for the transition from cohabitation to first birth  
 
 
Source: Models’ estimates (see Appendix A.2, Table B2), GGS and Italian FSS 2009 
 
Figure 4 show the hazard ratios for the transition to parenthood after marriage. Here, we do not 
observe such a clear pattern as the one observed for the transition to a non-marital birth. The only 
exception is Norway, since we found a negative educational gradient in the transition to both marital 
and non-marital first birth, though in the latter case the gradient is less marked. Moreover, in Italy, 
similar to Norway, low educated homogamous couples have the highest marital birth rates compared 
to all the other educational pairings. In Italy, such a gradient is much stronger than the one found for 
non-marital births. These results are in line with previous findings according to which highly educated 
women in Italy have higher relative first birth risks within cohabitation relative to marriage compared 
to medium educated women (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). In Bulgaria, in contrast, low educated 
homogamous couples tend to have lower marital birth rates compared to the medium educated 
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homogamous couples and the heterogamous couples with at least one highly educated partner (see 
Appendix A.3 – Table C3 for all the pairwise contrasts). In Austria and Romania, hypergamous 
couples, where men are highly educated, have a higher marital childbearing rate than hypogamous 
couples, where women are highly educated. These results provide evidence for hypothesis 3b, 
according to which couples where the man is more educated than the woman are more prone to marital 
childbearing compared to couples where the woman is more educated than the man. Meanwhile there 
is no statistically significant difference between hypergamous and hypogamous couples where the 
partner with the highest level of education is medium rather than highly educated. Moreover, 
comparing patterns in the transition to parenthood in marriage and unmarried cohabitation, we notice 
that in Austria hypogamous couples with a highly educated woman had significantly lower birth rates 
overall compared to hypergamous couples formed by a man who is highly educated. This implies that, 
at least in Austria, where the male-breadwinner model has remained relatively strong (Prskawetz et al. 
2008), hypogamous couples are not conducive to childbearing, irrespective of whether the couple is 
married or not. 
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Figure 4 Hazard ratios for the transition from marriage to first birth 
 
Source: Models’ estimates (see Appendix A.2, Table B3), GGS and Italian FSS 2009 
 
We briefly discuss the effects of two additional couple level variables, namely the effect of  the 
union’s cohort and the age difference between partners. As expected, across European countries 
unions formed most recently between 2000-2010 had a lower transition rate to marriage compared to 
unions formed in the 1990s (our reference category). On the other hand, unions formed in the 1970s 
and ‘80s had a higher transition rate from cohabitation to marriage compared to the reference category. 
This cohort-effect is probably due to the fact that, ceteris paribus, unmarried cohabitation becomes 
over time more socially accepted and individuals tend to spend more time as an unmarried couple, 
feeling less the pressure to get married. We ran the same models by censoring the observation time 
after 5 or 10 years since co-residential union and the results were robust. Next, we did not find a 
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strong effect with regard to the age difference between partners. Also in other contexts the age 
difference between partners with regard to fertility within cohabiting unions was not found to be 
significant (cf. Wu 1996). The age difference between partners mattered the most for the transition 
from cohabitation to marriage: where the effect was significant, more traditional types of couples, i.e. 
those where he is older than her, tend to have a higher transition rate to marriage than couples where 
partners have a similar age. Such a finding is in line with the hypothesis that more traditional couples 
are more prone to marriage compared to other pairings, i.e. hypothesis 3a. However, this holds only 
for the transition from cohabitation to marriage, when it comes to childbearing, the effect of age 
difference is not significant. 
Discussion: the beaten path to parenthood 
In recent decades, an important focus of family demographic studies has been the determinants of 
non-marital childbearing. In particular, scholars have tended to focus on the association between 
socio-economic resources and the risk of having a non-marital birth for women. Rarely they have 
looked at male characteristics. Yet, this kind of approach disregarded the fact that marital and non-
marital births typically occur within a union and considering only the characteristics of one partner 
may lead to a misinterpretation of the results.  
In this study, we examined whether and how the educational pairing, i.e. how his and her 
education combine, affects the likelihood of first birth within marriage and cohabitation in twelve 
European countries. We investigated whether, beyond the role of the absolute level of education, 
which has been previously studied, there is an effect of educational assortative mating. We observed 
couples who are in a co-residential union and examined their pathways to parenthood by means of 
multistate modelling. 
Overall, we found most support for our general first hypothesis, according to which a higher level 
of human capital is associated with a lower likelihood of non-marital family formation. This 
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hypothesis is based on the argument that educational resources, intended as indicator for long-term 
good economic prospects, may be perceived as prerequisites to marry. Our results show that couples 
with lower human capital tend to stay longer in an unmarried relationship compared to their 
counterparts with higher human capital (Hypothesis 1a). Couples with lower human capital also tend 
to have a higher transition rate to a non-marital first birth in most of the countries considered. The 
presence of at least one highly educated partner, independently of whether it is he or she, inhibits the 
rate of non-marital first childbearing (Hypothesis 1b). Moreover, additional analyses suggested that 
more education is positively associated with marriage rates even after having a first non-marital child 
(results not shown).  
In line with previous findings, we did not find support for our second hypothesis about the role 
of homogamy, on top of the role of each partners’ level of education, for the transition to marriage. 
According to this hypothesis, homogamous couples are more inclined to marry compared to the 
heterogamous ones (cf. Blackwell and Lichter 2000). The behaviour of educationally homogamous 
couples is not statistically different from that of educationally heterogamous couples. Rather, the 
transition to marriage depends on the overall human capital of the couple. Bulgaria is an interesting 
exception to this pattern: there, we found that couples where partners have different levels of 
education have higher marriage rates compared to the highly educated homogamous couples who, 
instead, are less likely to marry. This result contrasts both with our first and second hypotheses. It 
contrasts with Hypothesis 1a because we expected that a higher level of human capital would enhance 
the transition to marriage and this is not the case in Bulgaria. Furthermore, it contrasts with our second 
hypothesis which is about the role of homogamy in marriage. In Bulgaria, our findings indicate that 
the heterogamous couples with at least one highly educated partner are more inclined to marry, 
instead. We can speculate that this occurs because of the advantages derived from a specialization 
model à la Becker, characterized by unequal but complementary socio-economic resources within the 
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couples, not attached to traditional gender roles in this case (Becker 1991; Schoen and Weinick 1993; 
Brines and Joyner 1999). 
Next, we did not find evidence supporting our general third hypothesis, which focuses on the 
difference in the effect of his versus her education. Based on the Beckerian specialization model, we 
hypothesized that hypergamous couples are more inclined towards marital family formation 
compared to hypogamous couples for at least two reasons. First, couples where he has more education 
than her may reinforce traditional behaviours driven by the imbalance of socio-economic resources 
in favour of the man. Second, they may be more economically advantaged by the fact that, ceteris 
paribus, men earn on average more than women. Our results show that in most countries there is no 
statistically significant difference in the pathways to the first birth between hypergamous and 
hypogamous couples. Poland represents an exception: hypergamous couples composed of a highly 
educated man have a lower transition rate to marriage compared to the hypogamous couples and all 
the other homogamous educational pairings, which is in contrast with Hypothesis 3a. Other studies 
focusing on Poland showed that couples in unmarried cohabitation are typical of unemployed people 
or people still enrolled in education who are supported economically by their parents (Kotowska et 
al. 2008; Matysiak 2009). This plausibly also explains our findings, since additional data-inspections 
revealed that those couples were formed mostly by young people who have not completed their 
education yet by the time they start their co-residence. 
We should mention a number of limitations of this study. First of all, it is worth reminding that 
to answer our research question we limited our study to people who were in a union at the time of 
interview. By applying a multi-state framework, we could account for the selective exit from 
cohabitation via marriage of “surviving” unions, but we could not empirically test the role of divorce 
or separation. As a result, in our study we could not disentangle the two arguments based on whether 
commitment is manifested via marriage or via childbearing, since in our sample the more stable 
couples, i.e. where childbearing is more likely, are overrepresented. In the future, it would be 
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interesting to examine how educational assortative mating varies across union type and its interactions 
between union dissolution and childbearing. It could be that we underestimated the differential role 
of partners’ education in our study, which has been cancelled out by considering mainly couples 
where childbearing is more likely. Moreover, the way the selectivity of the sample may have altered 
the results also depends on the country. In particular, results may be especially biased for those 
countries with a strong association between educational pairing and union dissolution rates. For 
instance, a previous study from Finland, which focused on cohabiting unions formed between 1995-
2002, found that unions where the woman is more educated than the man were more likely to dissolve 
(Mäenpää and Jalovaara 2014). However, other studies showed that this may not hold for marital 
unions formed after the 1990s (cf. Schwartz and Han 2014 for the United States; Theunis et al. 2015 
for Belgium). In order to check the sensitivity of our results to this selection, we ran analyses only 
for unions formed between 2000-2010 and we found that our conclusions remain the same. Moreover, 
given that for five countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland) we have 
information about previous partners’ education, we checked how different the samples are for these 
countries when considering also dissolved unions. Eventually, the distribution of educational pairings 
remained very similar in the two samples and, despite the selection, the smaller sample included a 
substantial proportion of events relative to the bigger sample (results available upon request). 
Our results point out that, among the more stable unions, the difference in partners’ education 
rarely plays a role in the choice between marital or non-marital birth, rather it is the overall absolute 
level of education that matters. Still, future studies should test if accounting for the selective exit from 
cohabitation or marriage via union dissolution affects the role of educational pairings on fertility 
behaviour. This could be achieved by using longitudinal country-specific data, which have detailed 
information on the time of partnerships’ formation and dissolution.  
Next, it is also possible that we were unable to grasp the role of educational heterogamy because 
of measurement issues. Since heterogamy is less common than homogamy, we could not consider all 
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the possible pairings of partners’ education due to small categories. By using a compound measure 
of educational pairing, which does not consider all the possible combinations, we may have 
overlooked the role of heterogamy. The absence of a statistically significant effect of heterogamy 
could be due to large standard errors. An obvious solution could be to use larger datasets. 
Alternatively, a diagonal reference model, which is a more parsimonious and interpretable approach 
to analyse dyads, may be an option (cf. Eeckhout et al. 2012), but diagonal reference models have not 
been implemented yet in combination with survival analysis. Measurement issues may be linked to 
another aspect: we could not include a time-varying covariate of educational pairing because of lack 
of information. Our results may suffer from anticipatory bias, since partners may have acquired their 
highest level of education after they start to co-reside. The use of more detailed data, which includes 
the full educational history of both partners, could help in avoiding anticipatory bias when applying 
event history analysis (Hoem and Kreyenfeld 2006).  
Finally, it is worth reminding that estimates of the multistate model for the transition to first birth 
within each union context may still reflect the overall educational gradient in childbearing of the 
country and cohorts considered. An overall negative educational gradient in the transition to 
parenthood is usually linked to the fact that the more educated tend to postpone the birth of the first 
child. Basically, our results point out that the negative educational gradient in the transition to first 
birth tends to be steeper within cohabitation than marriage. It will be interesting to see whether this 
will hold in the future, given that in some countries (e.g. Belgium, France, Norway) changes over 
time have been detected: especially for cohorts born in the 1960s or later, the overall negative 
educational gradient is weakening or even turning positive (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Goldscheider 
et al. 2015).  
Despite these limitations, our study yields insight into how educational pairings are associated 
with pathways to parenthood. It showed that it is important to also consider the male partner’s 
education since it can counterbalance the effect of women’s education. What has been called the 
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“pattern of disadvantage” framework, which usually refers to non-marital childbearing, finds support 
in our study. The more educated partners do not necessarily avoid cohabitation altogether, but they 
are more likely to get married once they plan or expect to have a child, or after having a child already. 
For European countries, similarly to United States, our results highlight that the diffusion of non-
marital childbearing among lower social strata may envisage a widening of social inequalities. Future 
studies could focus on children’s well-being to assess whether and to what extent a lack of human 
capital among unmarried parents translates in disadvantages for the children. It is plausible to expect 
that in more “open” societies, where individuals have fewer constraints in partnering with people of 
a different socio-economic status, the consequences for children born from unmarried parents will be 
offset in the longer term.  
As mentioned, we did not find a role of homogamy versus heterogamy. One reason could be that, 
in contexts where the majority of people acquires a high level of education, homogamy in lifestyles 
and values may not necessarily be linked much to the level of education. We may expect that 
educational assortative mating patterns linked to a specific field of study or occupation are more 
informative on how lifestyles affect the propensity for non-marital formation.  
Interestingly, evidence in support of hypotheses based on socio-economic arguments appeared 
more consistent across different countries. Hypotheses based on the role of educational assortative 
mating, instead, did not have strong empirical support and no clear patterns have been found across 
countries. In order to uncover the mechanisms that link the mate selection processes to fertility, the 
challenge to integrate micro and macro level studies remains. It would be interesting to investigate 
whether a higher degree of heterogamy within a country, i.e. more “open” societies, tend to have 
higher levels of non-marital childbearing. A higher degree of heterogamy implies that the more 
educated people increasingly mate with lower educated partners. Partners of lower educated persons 
who may be considered less attractive on the mating market may be inclined to settle for a less 
committed partnership without renouncing childbearing. In particular, as some authors pointed out, 
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this may be the case for the highly educated women, given the recent changes in education-specific 
mating markets (Harknett 2008; Van Bavel 2012). Thus, the distribution of non-marital childbearing 
among different social strata may be affected by the changing composition of mating markets. 
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Appendix A.1 
Table A1 Sample selection for each GGS country and the Italian-FSS 2009 
 GGS countries FSS 
 
Austria 
2008-09 
Belgium 
2008-10 
Bulgaria 
2004-05 
CzechRep 
2005 
Estonia 
2004-05 
France 
2005 
Hungary 
2004-05 
Lithuania 
2006 
Norway 
2007-08 
Poland 
2010-11 
Romania 
2005 Total 
Italy 
2009 
Initial sample size 5000 7163 12858 10006 7855 10079 13540 10036 14880 19987 11986 123390 43850 
Not in a union time of interview 1924 2281 4306 4490 2839 3991 4658 4305 4885 7709 3486 44874 22341 
Same sex couples 7 60 9 29 0 59 4 0 56 8 0 232 // 
Not born > 1950 (and for Italy 
being younger than 18 at time of 
interview) for the respondent  0 1295 2404 1735 1632 1995 3037 1632 2931 3082 2923 22666 7623 
Not born > 1950 (and for Italy 
being younger than 18 at time of 
interview) for the respondent's 
partner 18 176 284 179 200 234 394 132 347 494 374 2832 1017 
Children from previous 
relationships 476 573 421 544 791 599 534 417 1361 726 419 6861 264 
Date union missing 15 16 18 98 0 5 652 34 78 7 5 928 // 
Date birth missing 0 22 11 17 0 1 1 7 8 0 1 67 // 
Date birth <= 0 177 65 185 292 18 86 174 232 288 503 150 2170 281 
Woman's age missing or not in 
interval 15-45 17 31 184 25 11 12 69 10 35 16 45 455 82 
Man's age union formation < 15 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 // 
Date marriage missing 1 0 3 20 0 1 24 9 73 39 0 170 // 
Respondent's age missing 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 // 
Reported date of events after 
interview date 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Male respondent (only Italy) // // // // // // // // // // // // 6028 
Final N 2365 2641 5032 2577 2364 3097 3993 3257 4818 7403 4583 42130 6213 
Previous sample selection  
(Final N) 2366 2642 5031 2577 2364 3097 3994 3256 4819 7402 4583 42131 6213 
 
Note: Originally the sample selection has been done for all the GGS countries together. For this country-specific table, we have re-ran the sample selection. Since in case of missing 
information about the month of events we have used random imputation, variables related to the dates of events may have had few variations between the two runs of the sample-
selection. This is why the country specific sample sizes reported here do not exactly add up to the total pooled sample size.
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 Appendix A.2 
Table B1 Cox regressions by transitions: beta-coefficient estimates for the transition from cohabitation to marriage 
Transition from cohabitation to marriage AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Sex(ref. Male)             
Female -0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.03 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17  0.05 0.04 -0.004 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
Woman’s age at union 0.30*** 0.05 0.32*** 0.23** 0.33*** 0.44*** 0.24** 0.09 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.46*** 0.20** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
Woman age at union (squared) -0.004*** -0.001 -0.01*** -0.004** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Union's cohort (ref. 1990-1999)             
1967-1979 0.88 0.92*** 0.63*** 0.74*** 1.12*** 1.03*** 0.89*** 0.58** 0.37* 1.12*** 0.45*** 0.23 
 (1.02) (0.16) (0.06) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.22) (0.16) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) 
1980-1989 0.46*** 0.27** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.84*** 0.38*** 0.51*** -0.04 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.19 0.15 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) 
2000-2010 -0.24** -0.58*** -0.64*** -0.55*** -0.32* -0.31** -0.61*** -0.01 -0.84*** -0.30*** -0.45*** -0.43*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) 
Respondent's union order (ref. 1st union)             
Higher order unions -0.40*** -0.42*** -1.08*** -0.43* -0.05 -0.35*** -0.22* -0.11 -0.79*** -0.11 -0.56*** -0.80** 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.27) (0.17) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.24) (0.07) (0.17) (0.27) 
Age difference (ref. Age homogamy or 1 year difference)             
Woman older(2+) -0.24 -0.05 -0.30** -0.19 -0.08 -0.21* -0.31* -0.03 -0.16 -0.20* -0.13 -0.34* 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.17) (0.13) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) 
Man older (2-4 years) 0.15 0.25* 0.19*** 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.17 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) 
Man older (5+) 0.26** 0.35** 0.25*** 0.10 0.19 0.05 -0.19 -0.17 0.14 0.12 0.07 -0.08 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) 
NA  -0.38 0.26 -0.07         
  (0.72) (0.29) (1.03)         
Conception (ref. No conceived)             
Conceived 0.98*** 0.92*** 0.35*** 0.93*** 1.39*** 0.80*** 1.18*** 1.01*** 0.77*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.70*** 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Educational assortative mating (ref. Medium homogamous)             
Low homogamous 0.85*** 0.06 -0.85*** -0.35 -0.79** -0.08 -0.29 -0.32* -1.00*** -0.02 0.21 -0.76*** 
 (0.24) (0.17) (0.08) (0.22) (0.29) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.29) (0.18) (0.23) (0.13) 
High homogamous -0.28** 0.03 -0.34*** -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.32* 0.08 0.17* 0.01 -0.12 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) 
He high & She medium-low (Hypergamous) 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.26 0.12 0.09 -0.0001 0.24 -0.24 0.09 -0.40** 0.20 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) (0.20) (0.15) (0.10) (0.15) (0.19) 
He medium & She low (Hypergamous) 0.04 0.09 -0.54*** -0.31 -0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.15 -0.68** 0.14 -0.11 -0.28* 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.10) (0.25) (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) (0.25) (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) 
He medium-low & She high (Hypogamous) -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.26 -0.08 -0.15 0.09 0.30* 0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.12 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.19) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.26) 
He low &and She medium (Hypogamous) 0.64*** -0.22 -0.09 -0.38* -0.43** -0.16 -0.23 -0.09 -0.01 -0.14 0.09 -0.35 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.20) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20) 
NA  0.01 0.11 -0.10  -0.13    -0.94*** -0.07  
  (0.30) (0.50) (0.26)  (0.41)    (0.13) (0.32)  
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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 Table B2 Cox regressions by transitions: beta-coefficient estimates for the transition from cohabitation to first child 
 
Transition from cohabitation to first child AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Sex(ref. Male)             
Female 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.09 -0.13 0.04 -0.10  0.24 0.03 0.15 0.05 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13)  (0.17) (0.05) (0.10) (0.12) 
Woman age at union 0.31*** 0.12 0.14 -0.04 0.55*** 0.20** 0.08 -0.13 0.19 0.20*** 0.10 0.09 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) 
Woman age at union (squared) -0.01*** -0.002 -0.004 0.0001 -0.01*** -0.004** -0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.003*** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Union's cohort (ref. 1990-1999)             
1967-1979 0.71 0.14 -0.25 -0.15 -0.62** -0.29 -0.89* -0.02 0.41 -0.47*** -0.27 0.33 
 (1.02) (0.35) (0.16) (0.35) (0.21) (0.19) (0.38) (0.40) (0.42) (0.12) (0.27) (0.19) 
1980-1989 0.27* -0.55** -0.23 0.33 0.03 -0.23* -0.34 0.13 0.17 -0.27*** 0.09 0.31* 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.09) (0.19) (0.20) (0.28) (0.06) (0.19) (0.15) 
2000-2010 0.07 0.52*** -0.08 -0.06 -0.57*** 0.20 0.11 0.30* -0.13 0.04 -0.003 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) (0.14) (0.20) (0.07) (0.13) (0.18) 
Respondent's union order (ref. 1st union)             
Higher order union -0.12 0.02 -0.26 -0.07 -0.03 0.12 -0.25 0.32 0.09 0.19** 0.25 0.46 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.27) (0.30) (0.15) (0.11) (0.15) (0.20) (0.33) (0.06) (0.20) (0.26) 
NA        0.36**     
        (0.13)     
Age difference (ref. Age homogamy or 1 year difference)             
Woman older(2+) 0.18 -0.001 -0.42* 0.85** 0.06 0.13 0.30 0.14 0.38 0.01 0.25 -0.16 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.27) (0.15) (0.13) (0.23) (0.22) (0.32) (0.09) (0.18) (0.30) 
Man older (2-4 years) 0.13 0.08 -0.25* 0.25 0.05 0.23* -0.03 0.25 0.40 0.07 0.16 -0.08 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.10) (0.20) (0.16) (0.25) (0.07) (0.14) (0.21) 
Man older (5+) 0.15 0.19 -0.01 0.60** 0.19 0.30** 0.15 0.11 0.25 0.16* 0.15 0.07 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (0.16) (0.27) (0.07) (0.15) (0.20) 
NA  -1.62 -0.70    -0.33      
  (1.02) (0.72)    (0.75)      
Educational assortative mating (ref. Medium homogamous)             
Low homogamous 1.20*** 0.47* 1.09*** 0.82** 0.54** 0.37* 0.99*** 0.27 0.85** 0.22 0.91*** 0.75*** 
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.12) (0.27) (0.20) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.27) (0.15) (0.25) (0.16) 
High homogamous -1.00*** -0.42** -0.88*** -0.22 -0.87*** -0.59*** -0.74* -0.27 -1.13*** -0.61*** -1.61*** -2.04** 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.21) (0.33) (0.16) (0.11) (0.30) (0.24) (0.33) (0.08) (0.19) (0.72) 
He high & She medium-low (Hypergamous) -0.17 -0.15 -0.31 -0.19 -0.56** -0.08 -0.64 -0.62 -0.66 -0.22* -0.60* -0.09 
 (0.12) (0.22) (0.35) (0.30) (0.19) (0.15) (0.39) (0.40) (0.36) (0.10) (0.25) (0.52) 
He medium & She low (Hypergamous) 0.38** 0.11 0.70*** 0.92** 0.31 0.44*** 0.96*** 0.23 0.35 0.25* 0.45* 0.47** 
 (0.14) (0.24) (0.16) (0.28) (0.18) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.31) (0.10) (0.20) (0.18) 
He medium-low & She high (Hypogamous) -0.61*** -0.51** -0.64** -0.36 -0.41*** -0.30** -0.40 -0.27 -0.65 -0.19* -0.69*** -1.40 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.43) (0.12) (0.12) (0.30) (0.23) (0.34) (0.08) (0.16) (1.01) 
He low &and She medium (Hypogamous) -0.09 0.42* 0.70*** 0.51 0.33* 0.12 0.67** 0.01 0.58* 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 (0.27) (0.20) (0.19) (0.26) (0.14) (0.13) (0.25) (0.18) (0.28) (0.11) (0.23) (0.31) 
NA  -1.17  -0.44  -0.06    -1.46*** 0.24  
  (0.72)  (0.72)  (0.45)    (0.11) (0.39)  
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table B3 Cox regressions by transitions: beta-coefficient estimates for the transition from marriage to first child 
 
Transition from marriage to first child  AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Sex(ref. Male)             
Female 0.09 0.01 0.09** 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.004  0.07 -0.04 0.12*** 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Woman age at union -0.03 0.12* 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.13** 0.05 -0.004 0.17*** -0.11*** -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Woman age at union (squared) -0.0001 -0.003* -0.002* -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union's cohort (ref. 1990-1999)             
1967-1979 1.15 -0.34*** -0.14** -0.30*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.97*** 0.005 -0.22*** 0.09 -0.05 -0.02 
 (1.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
1980-1989 -0.15* -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.11 -0.17** 0.03 0.04 -0.12* -0.02 0.003 0.06 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
2000-2010 -0.20* 0.11 0.07 -0.34*** -0.33* -0.12 -0.09 0.004 -0.10 -0.16* 0.02 -0.24*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) 
Respondent's union order (ref. 1st union)             
Higher order unions 0.05 0.14* -0.19 0.13 -0.17 -0.06 0.19* 0.15 0.19 0.14* 0.06 -0.02 
 (0.11) (0.06) (0.22) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.20) (0.07) (0.16) (0.19) 
Age difference (ref. Age homogamy or 1 year difference)             
Woman older(2+) 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.18* -0.14 0.18*** 0.02 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) 
Man older (2-4 years) 0.002 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.003 -0.02 -0.04 -0.003 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
Man older (5+) -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.14* -0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11** 0.05 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
NA  -0.26 -0.13 -0.48   0.40  -0.21    
  (0.36) (0.24) (0.51)   (0.58)  (1.00)    
Educational assortative mating (ref. Medium homogamous)             
Low homogamous -0.14 0.23* -0.19** 0.15 0.20 0.10 -0.01 0.20*** -0.06 0.27* 0.03 -0.003 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.06) (0.16) (0.22) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.14) (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) 
High homogamous 0.001 0.13 -0.07 -0.19* -0.15 0.005 -0.12 0.06 -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.27*** -0.25*** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
He high & She medium-low (Hypergamous) 0.09 0.10 0.04 -0.14 -0.11 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.24** -0.16* 0.10 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
He medium & She low (Hypergamous) 0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.33* 0.14 0.06 0.19*** 0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) 
He medium-low & She high (Hypogamous) -0.32** -0.07 -0.02 0.13 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.15* -0.17*** -0.16 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) 
He low &and She medium (Hypogamous) -0.13 0.03 -0.12 -0.27* 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.11 
 (0.16) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) 
NA  0.57** -0.69 -0.50**  -0.06   0.26 -0.18 -0.05  
  (0.18) (0.36) (0.16)  (0.34)   (0.71) (0.12) (0.16)  
N-episodes 5,328 4,765 11,009 4,387 4,761 6,689 5,782 7,783 4,832 10,197 10,339 6,245 
Log Likelihood -16,792 -18,651 -51,937 -17,173 -17,172 -24,508 -25,269 -44,330 -22,351 -38,065 -57,873 -33,413 
LR Test 
463.57*
**  
381.59**
*  
1,276.04**
*  
454.14**
*  
943.29**
*  
444.88**
*  
888.29**
*  
336.02**
*  
440.22**
*  
1,312.17**
*  
934.51**
*  
492.53**
*  
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Appendix A.3 
Table C1 Pairwise comparisons between levels of the educational pairing variable for the transition from cohabitation to marriage. Beta coefficients, 
reference category in bold  
 
 AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Low vs High homogamous 1.13*** 0.03 -0.51*** -0.29 -0.77** -0.11 -0.49* -0.64*** -1.08*** -0.19 0.20 -0.64*** 
 (0.25) (0.16) (0.09) (0.25) (0.30) (0.15) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.24) (0.18) 
He high She lower (Hypergamous) vs 
High homogamous 0.35** -0.04 0.31** -0.20 0.13 0.06 -0.20 -0.09 -0.33* -0.07 -0.41** 0.33 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.18) (0.15) (0.12) (0.20) (0.21) (0.17) (0.09) (0.16) (0.23) 
He medium She low (Hypergamous) vs 
High homogamous 0.32* 0.06 -0.20 -0.25 -0.04 -0.12 -0.28 -0.48* -0.77** -0.03 -0.16 -0.16 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.28) (0.19) (0.12) (0.20) (0.19) (0.26) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) 
He lower She high (Hypogamous) vs 
High homogamous 0.22 -0.07 0.25*** -0.21 -0.07 -0.17 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.21** 0.01 0.00 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.07) (0.22) (0.12) (0.09) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.28) 
He low She medium (Hypogamous) vs 
High homogamous 0.92*** -0.26 0.25* -0.32 -0.41* -0.19 -0.43 -0.41* -0.09 -0.31* 0.09 -0.22 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.10) (0.20) (0.18) (0.12) (0.23) (0.16) (0.20) (0.13) (0.18) (0.24) 
He high She lower (Hypergamous)   vs  
Low  homogamous -0.77** -0.07 0.82*** 0.09 0.91** 0.17 0.29 0.55* 0.75* 0.12 -0.61* 0.97*** 
 (0.25) (0.20) (0.12) (0.25) (0.31) (0.17) (0.24) (0.22) (0.31) (0.19) (0.27) (0.22) 
He medium She low (Hypergamous)  vs  
Low  homogamous -0.81** 0.03 0.32** 0.03 0.74* -0.02 0.21 0.16 0.31 0.16 -0.32 0.48** 
 (0.27) (0.21) (0.12) (0.32) (0.33) (0.18) (0.23) (0.19) (0.37) (0.19) (0.28) (0.15) 
He lower She high (Hypogamous) vs 
 Low  homogamous -0.90*** -0.10 0.77*** 0.08 0.71* -0.07 0.38 0.62*** 1.04*** -0.02 -0.19 0.64* 
 (0.26) (0.17) (0.09) (0.28) (0.30) (0.16) (0.22) (0.17) (0.31) (0.18) (0.25) (0.28) 
He low She medium (Hypogamous) vs  
Low  homogamous -0.21 -0.28 0.76*** -0.03 0.36 -0.08 0.06 0.23 0.99** -0.12 -0.12 0.42 
 (0.28) (0.21) (0.11) (0.27) (0.32) (0.18) (0.25) (0.16) (0.33) (0.21) (0.28) (0.22) 
He lower She high (Hypogamous)  vs   
He high She lower (Hypergamous) -0.13 -0.03 -0.06 -0.00 -0.20 -0.24 0.09 0.07 0.28 -0.13 0.42** -0.33 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.11) (0.22) (0.15) (0.13) (0.23) (0.21) (0.18) (0.10) (0.16) (0.31) 
He low She medium vs  
He medium She low (Hypergamous) 0.61** -0.32 0.45*** -0.06 -0.38 -0.06 -0.15 0.07 0.68* -0.28 0.20 -0.07 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.13) (0.30) (0.23) (0.16) (0.26) (0.19) (0.30) (0.15) (0.23) (0.22) 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table C2 Pairwise comparisons between levels of the educational pairing variable for the transition from cohabitation to first child. Beta coefficients, 
reference category in bold  
 
 AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Low vs High homogamous 2.21*** 0.88*** 1.97*** 1.04* 1.41*** 0.96*** 1.73*** 0.54* 1.98*** 0.84*** 2.52*** 2.79*** 
 (0.30) (0.21) (0.21) (0.41) (0.24) (0.17) (0.33) (0.24) (0.40) (0.15) (0.31) (0.72) 
He high She lower (Hypergamous) vs 
High homogamous 0.83*** 0.27 0.58 0.03 0.31 0.51** 0.10 -0.35 0.48 0.40*** 1.01*** 1.94* 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.38) (0.41) (0.23) (0.16) (0.47) (0.43) (0.46) (0.11) (0.29) (0.87) 
He medium She low (Hypergamous) vs 
High homogamous 1.38*** 0.52* 1.59*** 1.14** 1.17*** 1.03*** 1.71*** 0.50 1.48*** 0.87*** 2.07*** 2.51*** 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.42) (0.23) (0.14) (0.33) (0.26) (0.42) (0.10) (0.26) (0.73) 
He lower She high (Hypogamous) vs 
High homogamous 0.39 -0.09 0.24 -0.14 0.46** 0.30* 0.34 -0.01 0.48 0.43*** 0.93*** 0.64 
 (0.23) (0.16) (0.27) (0.52) (0.18) (0.13) (0.40) (0.29) (0.44) (0.08) (0.22) (1.23) 
He low She medium (Hypogamous) vs 
High homogamous 0.92** 0.83*** 1.59*** 0.74 1.20*** 0.72*** 1.41*** 0.28 1.71*** 0.71*** 1.76*** 2.24** 
 (0.31) (0.19) (0.26) (0.39) (0.19) (0.14) (0.37) (0.25) (0.40) (0.11) (0.29) (0.77) 
He high She lower (Hypergamous)  vs  
Low  homogamous -1.38*** -0.62* -1.39*** -1.01** -1.10*** -0.45* -1.63*** -0.89* -1.51*** -0.44** -1.51*** -0.85 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.34) (0.38) (0.26) (0.20) (0.42) (0.40) (0.41) (0.17) (0.34) (0.52) 
He medium She low (Hypergamous)  vs  
Low  homogamous -0.83** -0.36 -0.38* 0.10 -0.24 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.50 0.03 -0.46 -0.28 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.15) (0.35) (0.25) (0.18) (0.23) (0.20) (0.36) (0.17) (0.30) (0.16) 
He lower She high (Hypogamous) vs 
 Low  homogamous -1.81*** -0.98*** -1.72*** -1.18* -0.95*** -0.67*** -1.39*** -0.55* -1.50*** -0.41** -1.59*** -2.15* 
 (0.30) (0.23) (0.22) (0.49) (0.22) (0.17) (0.33) (0.24) (0.40) (0.15) (0.29) (1.01) 
He low She medium (Hypogamous) vs  
Low  homogamous -1.29*** -0.05 -0.38* -0.31 -0.21 -0.25 -0.32 -0.26 -0.27 -0.13 -0.76* -0.55 
 (0.36) (0.25) (0.18) (0.35) (0.22) (0.18) (0.27) (0.18) (0.34) (0.17) (0.33) (0.30) 
He lower She high (Hypogamous)  vs   
He high She lower (Hypergamous) -0.44* -0.36 -0.31 -0.18 0.16 -0.21 0.24 0.35 0.00 0.03 -0.09 -1.30 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.39) (0.50) (0.21) (0.17) (0.47) (0.43) (0.47) (0.11) (0.28) (1.12) 
He low She medium vs  
He medium She low (Hypergamous) -0.46 0.31 0.01 -0.40 0.02 -0.32* -0.30 -0.22 0.23 -0.15 -0.31 -0.27 
 (0.29) (0.26) (0.22) (0.36) (0.21) (0.16) (0.28) (0.22) (0.37) (0.13) (0.28) (0.31) 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table C3 Pairwise comparisons between levels of the educational pairing variable for the transition from marriage to first child. Beta coefficients, 
reference category in bold  
 
 AT BE BG CZ EE FR HU IT LT NO PL RO 
Low vs High homogamous -0.14 0.10 -0.11 0.34 0.35 0.10 0.11 0.14* 0.16 0.47*** 0.30*** 0.25** 
 (0.17) (0.09) (0.07) (0.18) (0.23) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) 
He high She lower (Hypergamous) vs 
High homogamous 0.09 -0.03 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.15 -0.04 0.21* -0.04 0.11 0.35*** 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) 
He medium She low (Hypergamous) vs 
High homogamous 0.09 -0.08 -0.02 0.20 0.48** 0.14 0.18* 0.13 0.37** 0.13 0.29*** 0.27*** 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.14) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
He lower She high (Hypogamous) vs 
High homogamous -0.32* -0.20* 0.06 0.31* 0.10 -0.07 0.11 -0.09 0.19** 0.05 0.10* 0.09 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) 
He low She medium (Hypogamous) vs 
High homogamous -0.13 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 0.31* 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.22** 0.36*** 
 (0.19) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) 
He high She lower (Hypergamous)   vs  
Low  homogamous 0.23 -0.14 0.23* -0.30 -0.31 -0.07 0.04 -0.18* 0.05 -0.51*** -0.19 0.10 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.18) (0.24) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) 
He medium She low (Hypergamous)  vs  
Low  homogamous 0.23 -0.19 0.09 -0.14 0.13 0.04 0.07 -0.00 0.22 -0.34* -0.01 0.02 
 (0.17) (0.11) (0.09) (0.19) (0.26) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.19) (0.14) (0.09) (0.06) 
He lower She high (Hypogamous) vs 
 Low  homogamous -0.18 -0.30** 0.17* -0.03 -0.25 -0.17 -0.00 -0.23*** 0.04 -0.42** -0.20* -0.15 
 (0.18) (0.10) (0.07) (0.19) (0.23) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.15) (0.14) (0.08) (0.11) 
He low She medium (Hypogamous) vs  
Low  homogamous 0.00 -0.20 0.06 -0.43* -0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.12** 0.02 -0.32* -0.08 0.12 
 (0.21) (0.11) (0.09) (0.20) (0.25) (0.12) (0.13) (0.05) (0.16) (0.16) (0.09) (0.10) 
He lower She high (Hypogamous)  vs   
He high She lower (Hypergamous) -0.41** -0.17 -0.06 0.27* 0.06 -0.10 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.26* 
 (0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) 
He low She medium vs  
He medium She low (Hypergamous) -0.23 -0.02 -0.03 -0.29 -0.16 -0.10 -0.02 -0.12* -0.20 0.02 -0.07 0.09 
 (0.19) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) (0.19) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.15) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
